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FILÁRTIGA’S LEGACY IN AN ERA OF MILITARY
PRIVATIZATION
Laura A. Dickinson∗
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala1 famously established the idea that domestic tort
suits might be brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)2 against
those accused of violating human rights norms.3 But what is the legacy of
this case in an era of military privatization? And, in particular, are there
available legal responses to what we might call the privatization of torture?
These are not hypothetical questions. In the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where
detainees were tortured and abused, the individuals involved in the torture
included not only members of the military, but contractors hired from the
private sector to do the interrogation and translation.4 If we see the principles
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Rasul v. Bush5 applied broadly so
that there is U.S. judicial review of government-run detention facilities
anywhere in the world,6 it is not far-fetched to think that we might see an
increasing turn to privately run detention facilities using private contractors
for supervision and interrogation in order to avoid such constitutional
oversight.
Moreover, because many international human rights are framed as rights
against state overreaching, the turn to private actors might, at first blush,
appear to present a significant problem for legal accountability. For example,

∗
Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Essay was prepared for a
symposium held in October 2005 at Rutgers University School of Law–Camden.
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
3. 630 F.2d at 887-89.
4. See P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2004, at B03 (“Sixteen of the 44 incidents of abuse the Army’s latest reports say happened at
Abu Ghraib involved private contractors outside the domain of both the U.S. military and the
U.S. government.”).
5. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
6. See id. At 484-85 (ruling that federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions challenging the detention of foreign nationals in military custody outside the
United States). Although the specific litigants in Rasul were detained at the U.S. naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it remains to be determined whether the holding of Rasul applies
only to detainees in Guantanamo or to any detainees within U.S. military custody anywhere in
the world).
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torture is defined as abuse committed by official actors,7 and therefore it
might appear that this “state action” requirement would effectively allow
human rights abuses committed by private actors to go unredressed. Indeed,
this has been precisely the concern raised by scholars about domestic
privatization of prisons, schools, and healthcare and welfare programs.8
Because U.S. constitutional scrutiny traditionally applies only to state
actors,9 privatization has been seen as a way of potentially undermining
constitutional oversight.10
7. The Torture Convention defines torture as only acts that are committed “by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture
Convention], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm.
8. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 23-24, on file with author) (contending that prison
privatization threatens to erode fundamental public values such as the humane treatment of
inmates and the integrity of the incarceration system); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374-76 (2003) (arguing that privatization limits the
reach of constitutional norms and proposing a revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a
means of applying these norms to a variety of privatized governmental activities).
9. Having its genesis in an 1883 Supreme Court decision overturning Reconstructionera civil rights legislation, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the so-called “state
action” doctrine rests on the observation that most constitutional commandments proscribe
only the conduct of governmental actors. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). And though scholars frequently have criticized the
state action doctrine for attempting to make incoherent distinctions between public and private
action, see, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLICPRIVATE PENUMBRA (1968); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of
“Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Duncan Kennedy,
The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982);
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835
(1985), courts show no sign of discarding the doctrine. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National Collegiate Athletic Association is not a
state actor); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987)
(holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation created by federal statute and given
control over U.S. participation in the Olympics, as well as exclusive oversight of private
amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state actor);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes
providing long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they
operate under contract with the government and make need determinations authorized by
statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools
are not state actors even though the government contracted with the schools to fulfill its
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Yet, it is my perhaps controversial claim that military outsourcing may
not, by itself, pose quite as serious an impediment to accountability as it may
first seem. To the contrary, human rights abuses by private contractors may
actually be more readily subject to legal action than abuses by official
governmental actors, both through civil suits under the ATCA to redress
violations of international human rights law, and through civil and criminal
litigation to redress violations of domestic law. Using the Abu Ghraib prison
abuse as a case study, this Essay will compare the possible forms of legal
accountability for official governmental actors and private contractors, and
suggest that the latter are at least as likely, and perhaps more likely, to be
held accountable for abuses.
At Abu Ghraib, U.S. military personnel responsible for detention
operations abused detainees by forcing them to strip and undergo acts of
sexual humiliation, threatening them with dogs, applying electric shocks,
subjecting them to mock executions, exposing them to severely cold weather,
beating them, nearly suffocating them, and, in some cases, killing them.11
Private employees operating under contract with the Department of the
Interior as interrogators and translators participated in the abuse alongside
uniformed military personnel and reportedly directed some of the activities.12
Such acts clearly violated multiple norms embodied in both international and
domestic law.13
statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs students). But see Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (holding that a private
organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is a state
actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating
prisoners pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor).
10. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 8, at 1403 (arguing that “[t]he danger is that handing
over government programs to private entities will operate to place these programs outside the
ambit of constitutional constraints, given the Constitution’s inapplicability to ‘private’
actors”); see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1507, 1508 (2001).
11. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 19-20
(2004); FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS
13 (2004); LIEUTENANT GEN. ANTHONY R. JONES & MAJOR GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
BRIGADE 68-95 (2004) [hereinafter FAY REPORT]; MAJOR GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16-17 (2004) [hereinafter
TAGUBA REPORT].
12. FAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 130-35; TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 11, at 48.
13. Under international law, the abuses could be characterized as torture; cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; or war crimes. See Rome Statute of the International
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Despite the magnitude of these violations, however, the avenues for legal
redress, even against the governmental actors, are extremely limited. First,
there are few, if any, international, Iraqi, or transnational venues in which the
governmental actors or entities could be held criminally or civilly liable. The
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has no jurisdiction over Iraq,14 and,
even if it did, under the complementarity principle, any domestic
investigation or prosecution would defeat jurisdiction.15 No other
international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction, either. Iraq could theoretically
bring a complaint against the United States before the Human Rights
Committee, the body charged with monitoring implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).16 However,

Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 7, 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_
statute(e).pdf; Torture Convention, supra note 7, arts. 1, 16; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The acts might also constitute crimes against humanity if the
abuses were “widespread or systematic” and committed “pursuant to . . . a State or
organizational policy.” ICC Statute, supra, art. 7. In addition, the acts alleged would likely
constitute offenses under U.S. law, which directly prohibits the international crimes of torture,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000), and war crimes, see id. § 2441, and which also
criminalizes assault, murder, manslaughter, and maiming. See, e.g., id. §§ 111 (assault), 114
(maiming), 1111 (murder), 1112 (manslaughter). Finally, the acts are crimes under Iraqi law,
see Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 7, Penal Code, § 3 (June 10, 2003),
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf
(adding prohibition on torture and cruel and inhuman treatment to Iraqi criminal code), and
U.S. military law, see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) (forbidding “cruelty and maltreatment”).
14. Unless the Security Council authorizes a case to proceed, the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction only when either the State in which the alleged crime occurred or the State of
which the accused is a national has consented to jurisdiction. ICC Statute, supra note 13, art.
12(2). Neither the United States nor Iraq has consented to jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (listing the ratification status of
the ICC Statute).
15. Under the complementarity regime, the ICC may not consider a case if a State with
jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case, “unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” ICC Statute, supra note 13, art.
17(1)(a).
16. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
arts. 28-45, U.N. Doc. A/G316 (Dec. 16, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
http://www.ohchr.org/English/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf. Iraq and the United States have both ratified
the ICCPR. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
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State-to-State complaints in such a venue are extraordinarily rare,17 and it
seems unlikely that, given Iraq’s continuing dependence on U.S. support and
aid, the Iraqi government would risk souring its relationship with the United
States by bringing such a complaint at any point in the near future. A suit in
the International Court of Justice, while conceivable, is unlikely for the same
reason. With regard to Iraqi courts, although criminal or civil proceedings
could theoretically be brought locally, the U.S. Coalition Provisional
Authority (“CPA”) granted immunity to U.S. and other foreign actors in
Iraq.18 Moreover, diplomatic, head-of-state, and other immunities may apply
to current and former officials, though it is of course an open question
whether such immunity provisions can effectively shield individuals from
accusations of gross human rights violations.19 Regardless, the Iraqi legal
system is likely not stable enough to consider such politically charged
cases.20 Finally, the prospects of a transnational suit in a third-party State
under principles of universal jurisdiction are also slim. For example, though
a group of Abu Ghraib victims filed an action for war crimes in Germany
under that country’s universal jurisdiction statute,21 the statute requires
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 DECEMBER 1966 (Jan.
26, 2006), http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm.
17. See HARRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 776 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that no interstate complaint has
ever been brought under any of the United Nations treaty-body procedures).
18. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), Status of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, § 2(1)
(June 27, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_
17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (“Unless provided otherwise herein, the
[Multinational Force], the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds
and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process.”).
19. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction
with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1075-80 (2004) (describing decisions of the
British House of Lords concerning the immunity claims of former Chilean leader Augusto
Pinochet); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. MDL 381, 04-CV-400, 2005
WL 729177, at *76-85 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2005) (ruling that contractor immunity defense
does not apply to international human rights claims).
20. See Robert F. Worth, 2 from Tribunal for Hussein Case Are Assassinated, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting on the political assassinations of Iraqi judges).
21. See Criminal Indictment Against United States Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld et al. for War Crimes Perpetrated Against Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Detention
Center 2003/2004, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/German_complaint_
English_Version.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (providing a literal translation of the
complaint as drafted by local counsel in Germany).
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approval from the chief German prosecutor before jurisdiction can be
exercised, and the prosecutor recently declined to move forward with the
case,22 most likely because of its politically sensitive nature.
The best options for holding official actors liable, therefore, are
domestic—but even these are not likely to be successful. There has been
some accountability within the U.S. military justice system. According to the
military, 251 officers and enlisted soldiers have been punished in some way
for misconduct related to prisoners.23 These are mostly fairly low-level
actors, however, and their punishments have been relatively light.24 Indeed,
the highest ranking officer convicted in relation to the abuses is only a
Captain, and though he was found guilty of kicking detainees and staging the
mock execution of a prisoner, he was sentenced to only forty-five days in
jail.25 Moreover, though the military has conducted some informal
investigations, there has been almost no accountability at higher levels,
despite suggestions that responsibility may lead further up the chain of
command.26 To date, no criminal or civil cases have been brought in U.S.
civilian courts, though such options are available at least in theory. Criminal
prosecutions could also be initiated under U.S. statutes that criminalize
torture27 and war crimes28 committed outside the United States. However, in
light of the administration’s reluctance either to characterize the Abu Ghraib
abuse as torture or to set a precedent for prosecutions of war crimes in
civilian courts, such prosecutions are unlikely. Indeed, even though the acts
of abuse may violate other federal laws for which military personnel can be
held responsible, the administration may well be reluctant to prosecute such
cases. Civil suits could be brought against U.S. government actors under
international law using the ATCA,29 but such suits have usually been brought
against non-citizens, and it is unclear how likely they are to succeed against
22. See German Prosecutor Rejects Investigation of Rumsfeld, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2005, at A9.
23. See Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2006, at A1 (quoting a military spokesperson).
24. See, e.g., id. (describing some of the cases and punishments received).
25. See id.
26. See id. (reporting that defense efforts to “point a finger of responsibility at higherranking officers” have repeatedly failed and observing that, other than a few reprimands,
“there is no indication that . . . senior-level officers and civilian officials will ever be held
accountable for the detainee abuses that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan”).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000).
28. Id. § 2441.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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U.S. military personnel. Indeed, although an argument could be made that
immunities should not apply to governmental officials accused of severe
human rights abuses,30 a claim of immunity remains a potentially effective
method to block a civil action.31 Avenues of relief under domestic law are
similarly confined. It is at best uncertain whether the Constitution applies
extraterritorially,32 and though the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) may
waive sovereign immunity for some domestic tort suits,33 such waiver is
quite limited.34
Viewed against this backdrop, the possibility of legal accountability for
private actors, either individuals or corporations, does not seem significantly
worse. While there are added hurdles for such actors in some settings, in
others there is actually a greater likelihood of legal accountability. Certainly
there is, again, no international court or tribunal that would be likely to
exercise jurisdiction, but, as discussed above, that is no different than for
governmental actors. Similarly, Iraqi courts are an unlikely venue both
because of the possible applicability of the CPA immunity provision35 and
because of the undeveloped state of the current Iraqi legal system—but these
courts would be equally unavailable for proceedings against governmental
actors.
Domestically, the military justice system is not available to try the nonstate actors because the U.S. Supreme Court has prohibited military trials of

30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. For example, at the highest levels, head-of-state and diplomatic immunities might
apply. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, para.
78 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment
/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (setting forth a judgment of the International Court of
Justice, quashing an arrest warrant on immunity grounds).
32. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004) (ruling that federal courts have
habeas corpus jurisdiction over suits brought by detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but leaving ambiguous whether this jurisdiction extends to U.S.
detention facilities elsewhere in the world); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265 (1990) (suggesting that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply only “to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community”); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Does a prisoner’s right to test
legality of a sentence then depend on where the Government chooses to imprison him?”).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
34. For example, suits arising from any discretionary function are barred, even if the
government officials in question abused their discretion. See id. § 2680(a).
35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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U.S. civilians absent a declaration of war.36 Yet, domestic criminal
prosecutions in civilian courts may be more likely than such prosecutions of
governmental actors. To be sure, prosecutions under the War Crimes Act or
the statute criminalizing extraterritorial torture37 are unlikely for the same
reasons that prosecutions of governmental actors are unlikely under these
statutes: because the administration appears reluctant to characterize the
abuses at Abu Ghraib as torture or to set a precedent for domestic civilian
prosecution under these provisions. Moreover, prosecutors applying these
statutes would need to show a sufficient nexus between the contractors and
the governmental actors to establish state action (though this may not be a
particularly onerous burden in this context).38 Nevertheless, prosecution
under ordinary domestic criminal law, which forbids the acts committed at
Abu Ghraib even if not characterizing them as torture, is a real possibility.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which was enacted precisely
because U.S. military courts are not an option for private actors, specifically
allows criminal charges to be brought against U.S. contractors working for
the Defense Department.39 Of course, because many of the contractors in
Iraq are operating under agreements with the CIA or with the Department of
Interior,40 the statute would not apply in all cases. The USA PATRIOT Act,
however, closes this loophole to some extent by expanding the United States’
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (“SMTJ”) to include facilities run
by the United States overseas.41 Thus, a prosecutor might bring charges
against private actors mistreating detainees overseas if the abuse constitutes a
36. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1960)
(prohibiting military jurisdiction over civilian dependents in time of peace, regardless of
whether the offense was capital or noncapital); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960)
(holding that civilian employees committing capital offenses are not amenable to military
jurisdiction); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1960)
(expanding Grisham to include noncapital offenses); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957)
(holding that civilians in time of peace are not triable by court-martial for capital offenses).
37. See supra note 13.
38. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
39. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267
(2000).
40. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2004), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
docs/wow/CACI_ordersAll.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) (agreement to supply military
interrogators).
41. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. VIII, § 804, 115 Stat. 272,
377 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 7).
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crime within the SMTJ as long as the crime was committed within a U.S.
facility.42 In fact, one private contractor who was working for the CIA and
was implicated in detainee abuse in Afghanistan has been indicted in the
United States for assault committed within the SMTJ.43
On the civil side, a number of possibilities also exist. Civil suits under
the ATCA already have been filed against the contractors implicated at Abu
Ghraib for violations of international law.44 Because they have been brought
against private parties, these suits will need to demonstrate a link to state
action, at least with respect to the claims of torture and other norms that
require such a link.45 However, in the Abu Ghraib setting such a link may not
be so difficult to establish because the private contractors were working in a
facility actually run by the U.S. government. To be sure, there is some
ambiguity as to whether the uniformed personnel were taking orders from the
contractors or vice versa. Yet, under even the narrow construction of the
state action doctrine found in U.S. constitutional law, or, alternatively, under
a theory of joint criminal action, the activities at Abu Ghraib would probably
be actionable. If the prison were managed entirely by private contractors,
showing a nexus to the state would be more difficult. But while U.S. courts
have imported the state action doctrine from U.S. constitutional law into
ATCA cases, they have applied the doctrine in a much broader way than they
have in ordinary domestic suits.46 International courts have also tended to
apply theories of complicity, such as joint criminal enterprise, quite
42. See id.
43. See Farah Stockman, CIA Contractor Is Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at A1.
44. See T. Christian Miller, Ex-Detainees Sue 2 U.S. Contractors: Employees of Titan
and CACI Are Accused of Torturing Prisoners. Lawyers Say the Action Is Based on a Military
Report on Abuse, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A9.
45. For example, as previously noted, see supra note 7, the Torture Convention defines
torture as only acts that are committed “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Torture
Convention, supra note 7. An ATCA suit based on an allegation of torture would therefore
also need to satisfy this state action requirement in order to establish a violation of the law of
nations. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.” (emphasis added)).
46. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4-6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (ruling that an ATCA complaint alleged sufficient complicity
between governmental and private actors to survive a motion to dismiss), vacated in part by
77 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV.
8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (same).
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broadly.47 Thus, in the international context, even where private actors wield
considerable discretion to manage detention facilities, it is not nearly as
difficult to demonstrate a sufficient link to the State.
Finally, an under-explored avenue is the extent to which ordinary
municipal law, such as tort law, might provide norms that could be used to
address human rights abuses like those committed at Abu Ghraib. For
example, assault or battery in the law of many countries would cover the
same conduct that would give rise to a torture claim. In many suits brought
under the ATCA in the United States, plaintiffs assert state law tort claims
under a theory of supplemental jurisdiction.48 But such claims might also be
asserted directly through forms of transnational tort litigation.49
A significant advantage of these suits against private contractors,
whether under international law and the ATCA or under municipal law, is
that an argument can be made that governmental immunities do not apply.
To be sure, for cases brought in the United States, contractors might argue
that, in addition to immunities arguably granted by the CPA, they should get
the benefit of the so-called “government contractor defense,” the immunity
given to governmental actors under the FTCA.50 There is, however, at least a
plausible argument that immunity should not apply to these types of claims.
The case that establishes the government contractor defense, Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.,51 involved a products liability claim (not a claim
47. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 79 (2005) (noting the trend and arguing that such broad
use of complicity theories “if not limited appropriately, [has] the potential to lapse into forms
of guilt by association, thereby undermining the legitimacy and the ultimate effectiveness of
international criminal law”).
48. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 195 (D. Mass. 1995) (asserting
supplemental jurisdiction over municipal tort claims appended to human rights claims brought
under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000))).
49. See generally TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001)
(collecting essays on using tort law to advance a transnational human rights agenda).
50. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988) (ruling that
government contractors can claim immunity from civil suit under the FTCA’s provision
barring “‘[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused’” (alterations in original)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a))).
51. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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regarding a services contract) and also limited the defense to circumstances
in which the government set the design specifications with reasonable
precision, leaving little discretion to the contractor.52 At least one court has
concluded that the defense does not apply to international human rights
claims.53 Even for domestic claims arising from tort and contract, an
argument could be made that, because the government contracts for services
at Abu Ghraib prison were not particularly specific, the contractor should not
be able to invoke immunity.54 In any event, it is clear that when the
government privatizes military functions, individuals seeking redress may
actually have more avenues to pursue legal accountability than when the
government performs military functions directly.
Military privatization thus may not jeopardize the possibility of holding
human rights abusers accountable for their actions as much as it may at first
seem. To be sure, part of the reason for privatization’s relatively limited
impact is no cause for celebration. It is because the baseline of accountability
for official governmental actors is quite low—that is, it is relatively unlikely
that any court will hold military actors accountable for torture or other
abuses.55 And the viability of legal claims against private military contractors
who commit atrocities depends in part on the continued existence of the
ATCA, a state of affairs that is by no means certain.56 Congress could choose
to repeal the statute, and in the wake of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,57 courts
could construe the statute quite narrowly.58 But even if the courts define the
52. See id. at 512-13.
53. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 7, 90-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
54. Cf. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 688-89 (D.N.J. 2004)
(rejecting the government contractor defense for tort claims against a private prison
management corporation because the contract did not specifically require or approve of the
corporation’s practices that led to abuse).
55. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
56. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce has lobbied Congress to
repeal the statute. See, e.g., Conal Walsh & Oliver Morgan, UK Firms Face Lawsuits as Watts
Quits ICC Post: Companies Left Fighting US Human Rights Act After Former Shell Chairman
Resigns, OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/
0,3858,4894566-110373,00.html (referring to such efforts).
57. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
58. Sosa limited the scope of cognizable ATCA claims to those that “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725.
Needless to say, this formulation leaves open a tremendous amount of room for future
interpretation and elaboration, and some courts may decide to construe the range of
permissible claims quite narrowly indeed.
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substantive categories of international human rights claims subject to suit
under the ATCA in a limited way, courts thus far have seemed willing to
view the “state action” question under international law more broadly than
they do domestically.59 It will be the task of practitioners to convince them
that they should continue to do so. And, more importantly, transnational tort
suits brought under domestic laws remain an under-explored means of
holding human rights abusers accountable. Such suits against private military
contractors will be necessary to continue building on Filártiga’s legacy.

59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

